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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Equity - Specific Performance - Certainty as to Terms
Purchaser sued Vendor for specific performance of a contract to
sell land. The contract, after describing the property to be conveyed,
provided: "Price to be $10,000. Buyer agrees to pay $2,000 cash;
balance at six per cent interest. Payments to be agreed upon by
seller and buyer. We have agreed as follows: fifteen annual install-
ments as balance." Held: A contract for the sale of land which pro-
vides: (1) for deferred payment of the balance of purchase price in
fifteen annual installments but not the amount of the several in-
stallments and (2) for six per cent interest on the deferred balance
but not when the interest is payable or in what amounts; is too
indefinite and uncertain for specific performance. Bryant v. Clark,
-Tex.__, 358 S.W.2d 614 (1962).
Specific performance of a contract is an equitable remedy' which
compels a defaulting party to fulfill the contractual requirements.
The relief of specific performance is not a matter of absolute right,'
but rests in the sound discretion of the court. It is to be determined
from all the facts and circumstances.4 The basis for the remedy is
that by compelling the parties to do the thing they have agreed to,
more complete and perfect justice can be attained than by giving
damages for a breach of the contract!
ISterback v. Robinson, 148 Md. 24, 128 Att. 894 (1925); Keys v. Hopper, 270 Mich.
504, 259 N.W. 319 (1935); Gotthelf v. Stranahan, 138 N.Y. 345, 34 N.E. 286 (1893);
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Municipal Gas Co., 117 Tex. 331, 3 S.W.2d 790 (1928); Restatement,
Contracts § 326(c) (1932).
2Nunnally v. Holt, 1 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Wilson v. Beaty, 211 S.W.
524 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) error ref.; 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1401 (5th ed.
1941). Equity supplies a means of compelling a party to do that which he ought to have
done without the coercive power of the court. Guadalupe County Bd. of Educ. v. O'Bannon,
26 N.M. 606, 195 Pac. 801 (1921); Edwards v. Tobin, 132 Ore. 30, 284 Pac. 562 (1930);
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Municipal Gas Co., supra note 1; Restatement, Contracts § 326(c)
(1932).
'Wesley v. Eells, 177 U.S. 370 (1900); McCabe v. Matthews, 155 U.S. 550 (1895);
49 Am. Jur. Specific Performance S 8 (1943).
'Haffner v. Dobrinski, 215 U.S. 446 (1910); Hennessay v. Woolworth, 128 U.S. 438
(1888).
'Bates v. Smith, 48 S.D. 602, 205 N.W. 661 (1925); Stevens v. Palmour, 269 S.W.
1057 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
The most important aspect of land, insofar as the equitable remedy of specific perform-
ance is concerned, is that no piece of land has its counterpart anywhere else, and it is im-
possible of duplication. As a result, contracts for the sale of land are the subject matter
most commonly involved in actions for specific performance. A presumption has arisen that
only the acquisition of the exact land bargained for will give the party complete relief.
Therefore, as a general rule, equity courts will specifically enforce contracts for the sale of
land, and it is as much a duty of the court to decree specific performance as it is to give
damages for its breach. Bennett v. Copeland, 149 Tex. 474, 235 S.W.2d 605 (1951);
Simpson v. Green, 231 S.W. 375 (Tex. Com. App. 1921) adopted; Restatement, Contracts
§ 360 (1932).
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Equity requires for specific enforcement of a contract that it be
complete, definite, and certain in all of its essential terms.' A court
of equity will not furnish terms that may be contrary to the in-
tentions of the parties, thereby creating a new contract.7 Two of
the tests used for ascertaining certainty are: (1) the terms must be so
clear that the court can determine what the contract is and can re-
quire that the specific thing agreed to be done shall be done' and (2)
the intentions of the parties must be ascertainable to a "reasonable
degree of certainty."' Absolute certainty is not required.1'
The certainty required is often greater for specific performance
than for the legal remedy of damages." The reason given is that
the action for damages is founded upon mere nonperformance,
which can be established without determining all of the terms of the
agreement with exactitude." In contrast, the equity court must
frame a decree which accurately states what the defendant is to do."
However, the soundness of the distinction has been challenged. Critics
point out that creation of the dichotomy results in the absurdity of
having contracts bind defendants to do something in general, but
nothing in particular. 4 Also, even in an action at law, the jury still
must determine the exact terms of the contract to ascertain whether
a breach has occurred, and if so, to determine what the proper dam-
ages are.
'Preston v. Preston, 95 U.S. 200 (1877); Stanton v. Singleton, 126 Cal. 657, 59 Pac.
146 (1899); Daubmyre v. Hunter, 86 Fla. 326, 98 So. 69 (1923); Hume v. Bogle, 204
S.W. 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1404 (5th ed.
1941); Restatement, Contracts § 370 (1932).7 Kearns v. Andree, 107 Conn. 181, 139 Atl. 695 (1928); Ward v. Newbold, 115 Md.
689, 81 At. 793 (1911); Zimmerman v. Rhoads, 226 Pa. 174, 75 Atl. 207 (1910); Wilson
v. Beaty, 211 S.W. 524 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) error ref.; Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 Utah
575, 206 Pac. 262 (1922).
'Emery Memorial v. Cincinnatti Underwriters Agency Co., 88 F.2d 506 (6th Cir.
1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 696 (1937); Russell v. Agar, 121 Cal. 396, 53 Pac. 926
(1898); Thompson v. Weimer, 1 Wash. 2d 145, 95 P.2d 772 (1939); 49 Am. Jur. Specific
Performance § 22 (1943).
'Price v. Stipek, 39 Mont. 426, 104 Pac. 195 (1909); United Press v. New York Press
Co., 164 N.Y. 406, 58 N.E. 527 (1900); Central Mortgage Co. v. Michigan State Life Ins.
Co., 43 Okla. 33, 143 Pac. 175 (1914).
1" Long v. Reiss, 290 Ky. 198, 160 S.W.2d 668 (1942); Trotter v. Lewis, 185 Md. 528,
45 A.2d 329 (1946). In Jackson v. Rogers, 111 S.C. 49, 96 S.E. 692 (1918), the court
states: "The law does not require mathematical or absolute certainty in the terms of a
contract to make it enforceable. The written document must express clearly the intentions
of the parties, but there is no rule of law which requires it to be a work of art."
'Preston v. Preston, 95 U.S. 200 (1877); Stay v. Tennille, 159 Ala. 514, 49 So. 238
(1909); Hotopp v. Adair, 144 Ark. 69, 223 S.W. 393 (1920); Maloy v. Boyett, 53 Fla.
956, 43 So. 243 (1907); Young v. Schwint, 108 Kan. 425, 195 Pac. 614 (1921); Tanner v.




"4Walsh, Equity 329, 330 (1930); Pound, Progress Of The Law-Equity, 33 Harv.
L. Rev. 420 (1920).
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In contrast to the requirement of certainty is the policy of the
law against the destruction of contracts merely because of vagueness.
Ordinarily, the courts will specifically enforce a contract couched
in general terms when the details can be supplied by implication of
law."1
In the principal case, the court held that the contract in question
was too indefinite and uncertain to allow specific performance."6
The court quoted from Pomeroy's treatise on specific performance"'
to the effect that specific performance demands a clear, definite, and
precise understanding of all the terms."' However, the court failed
to mention a subsequent section of the same treatise which states
that "subordinate details can be supplied or inferred by the law."'
A similar statement from the Restatement of the Law of Contracts"0
requiring reasonable certainty of terms was relied upon by the
court." However, a comment of the Restatement under the section
cited reads as follows:
Expressions that at first appear incomplete or uncertain are often
readily made clear and plain by the aid of common usage and reason-
able implications of fact. Apparent difficulties of enforcement due to
uncertainty of expression may disappear in the light of courageous
common sense." (Emphasis added.)
By the court's emphasis and omissions in the above cited authori-
ties, a fundamental analytical error is apparent. Although it is true
that to be specifically enforced a contract must be complete, definite,
"Everett v. Dilley, 39 Kan. 73, 17 Pac. 661 (1888); Spiritusfabriek Astra v. Sugar
Prods. Co., 221 N.Y. 581, 116 N.E. 1077 (1917); O'Herin v. Neal, 56 S.W.2d 1105 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932) error ref.; Pomeroy, Specific Performance § 161 (3d ed. 1926).
10358 S.W.2d at 615. The court stated the general rule of equity that a contract to
be specifically enforceable must be definite, certain, and complete in all its material terms
and cited for authority a number of treatises and cases. 358 S.W.2d at 616-17.
" Pomeroy, Specific Performance S 159 (3rd ed. 1926).
18358 S.W.2d at 616.
s0 Where the terms which the parties have expressed in their contract are gen-
eral, and the subordinate details can be supplied or inferred by the law, the
agreement will thereby be rendered sufficiently certain; the vagueness and
obscurity which might result from the generality of the express provisions are
obviated by the legal implications. Pomeroy, Specific Performance § 161, at
410 (3d ed. 1926). See also 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1405 (5th ed.
1941).
"0 Restatement, Contracts § 370 (1932). The court also relied upon Wilson v. Fisher,
144 Tex. 53, 188 S.W.2d 150 (1945), and Williams v. Manchester Bldg. Supply, 213 Ga.
99, 97 S.E.2d 129 (1957), as authority for the general rule. 358 S.W.2d at 616-17.
However, the facts in both cases are so different from those in the instant case that they
add nothing by way of explanation.
2' 358 S.W.2d at 616.
"Restatement, Contracts § 370, at 674 (1932). This quotation is also contained in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Hamilton. 358 S.W.2d at 619.
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and certain; absolute certainty is not required." Reasonable certainty
is sufficient. 4
The court also seemingly overlooked the important corollary to
the general rule, i.e., expressions that at first appear incomplete or
uncertain are often readily made clear and plain by the aid of (1)
common usage, 2  (2) reasonable implications of law2' and fact,"7
and (3) common sense." A Texas court of appeals, in Burger v. Ray,
stated: "A contract not only includes the things said or written,
but also terms and matters which, though not actually expressed, are
implied by law, and these are as binding as those terms actually
written or spoken."'"
The court in the instant case struck down the provision of the
contract which related to the amount of the installments. The con-
tract read: "15 annual installments as balance." The court concluded
that this provision was indefinite because it contained no provision
as to the amount of such installments. Purchaser's contention that
the fifteen annual installments were to be paid in equal amounts was
rejected because the court said that the parties could have provided
otherwise. However, there was no mention of a contrary intent in
the contract. Justice Hamilton, in his dissenting opinion, stated:"
The very fact that the contract contained no such provisions is the
reason why the court could conclude with reasonable certainty that
the parties intended that the deferred balance would be payable in fif-
teen equal annual installments. It is the absence of the suppositions
proposed by the court that compels this construction of the contract.
The court by reaching this construction would not be making a new
contract for the parties, but would merely be enforcing the obvious
intent of the parties.
"
' State Highway Comm'n v. Ames, 143 Kan. 847, 57 P.2d 17 (1936); Long v. Reiss,
290 Ky. 198, 160 S.W.2d 668 (1942); Trotter v. Lewis, 185 Md. 528, 45 A.2d 329
(1946); Kleinschmidt v. Central Trust Co., 103 Ore. 124, 203 Pac. 598 (1922); Langley
v. Norris, 141 Tex. 405, 173 S.W.2d 454 (1943); Stevens v. Palmour, 269 S.W. 1057
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
2Micheli v. Taylor, 114 Colo. 258, 159 P.2d 912 (1945); Steele v. Nelson, 139 Kan.
559, 32 P.2d 253 (1934); Stinchcomb v. Stinchcomb, 207 Okla. 59, 246 P.2d 727 (1952);
Langley v. Norris, 141 Tex. 405, 173 S.W.2d 454 (1943); Wilson v. Beaty, 211 S.W. 524
(Tex. Civ. App. 1919) error ref.; Ellis v. Wadleigh, 27 Wash. 2d 941, 182 P.2d 49 (1947).
A contract should be sufficiently definite so as reasonably to define the rights of the respec-
tive parties. O'Herin v. Neal, 56 S.W.2d 1105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error ref.
2Wagner v. Eustathiw, 169 Cal. 663, 147 Pac. 561 (1915); Restatement, Contracts
5 370 (1932).
2Burger v. Ray, 239 S.W. 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) error dism.
27 Restatement, Contracts § 370 (1932).
28 Ibid.
2'239 S.W. 257, 259 (1922). See also Shealy v. Edwards, 73 Ala. 175 (1882); Bowser
v. Marks, 96 Ark. 113, 131 S.W. 334 (1910); Bird v. Couchois, 214 Mich. 607, 183 N.W.
36 (1921).
8 358 S.W.2d at 617. J. Smith concurred in the dissent.
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The construction urged by Purchaser did not call for an abuse of
discretion. In the words of Roscoe Pound:"
If the courts ought not to be wiser than the parties and make their
contracts over for them, they [the court] ought not to conjure up
objections that blind them to what the parties have agreed to and
thus defeat fair business transactions.
Wilson v. Beaty," a leading case in Texas on the subject of
specific performance upon which Purchaser strongly relied, was
distinguished by the court. The contract, in Wilson, stated that the
purchaser agreed to execute notes payable on or before the fifteenth
day of December of each year with the option of paying them at
anytime not later than five years from the date of their execution.
The number of notes was not specified in the Wilson contract; the
court stated that this was immaterial and would create no uncer-
tainty because the purchaser had the option of paying all or any
part of the contract at any time before the end of the five year term.3
The court overlooked an important aspect of the Wilson case.
Although the court in Wilson stated that a contract for the sale of
land could not be specifically enforced when there was no certainty
as to the time of payments of the purchase money, they later sup-
plemented this statement, in dictum, by approving of the granting
of specific performance in a situation where the exact number of
payments, the exact sum of each payment, and the exact date each
was due were not named in the contract." The court in Wilson con-
cluded that the granting of specific performance in such a situation
"seems reasonable and full of common sense and justice, which
should be decisive in every case."33
The court, in the principal case, also struck down the interest
provision for being too indefinite and uncertain. The interest pro-
vision stated: "balance at six per cent interest." The court concluded
that uncertainty existed because it was not clear when the interest
was to be paid,3 citing Harter v. Morris3' and Goode v. Westside
Developers, Inc." as authority.
In Harter, an Indiana case, the contract provided for six per cent
interest and for the "usual prepayment privileges." The Indiana
court refused to grant specific performance because it could not
3 Pound, op. cit. supra note 14, at 435.
3'211 S.W. 524 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) error ref.
33 358 S.W.2d at 616.34 211 S.W. at 528.
35 Ibid.
3' 358 S.W.2d at 617.
3772 Ind. App. 189, 123 N.E. 23 (1919).
3 258 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.
1963 ]
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ascertain what was meant by "usual prepayment privileges." No
such vague allusion was present in the instant case.
The Goode case was the only Texas case cited by the court as
authority on the interest question. But interest was nowhere men-
tioned in that case. However, it is interesting to note the three
cases cited by the Goode court, viz., Hume v. Bogle," Bean v.
Holmes,"° and Elliott v. Brooks."'
In Hume, the contract provided for seven per cent interest to be
agreed upon later. In Bean, the contract omitted any reference to
interest. And, in Elliott, the entire "contract" consisted of the fol-
lowing two statements made by the vendor: (1) "I would take $30
for the place;" and (2) "I believe I will let you sell the place at
$30 cash."
Although none of the above four cases offers any help for the
interest problem in the instant case, other cases do exist on the
specific point. In Ebrenstrom v. Phillips," the Delaware Chancery
stated: "The omission from the agreement of the provision whether
the interest was payable annually or semi-annually is not of such a
serious character as to render the contract really ambiguous." In
Wagner v. Eustathiw," the California Supreme Court stated:
True it is that while it [the contract] fixes the interest at the rate of 7
per cent, there is no definite provision as to the payment of interest
monthly or annually. But in such a case custom steps in, and it will
be considered that in contemplation of the parties the interest would
be paid as is customary in contracts of the kind." (Emphasis added.)
The equities in the instant case were clearly with the Purchaser.
He was ready and willing to execute the contract. He had caused
the land to be surveyed and had deposited money in escrow to
apply on the cash down payment. The vendor did not allege either
in her answer or in her testimony that there was any misunder-
standing, mistake, or fraud as to the terms of the contract. She
merely said that she "loved her place" and did not feel that she could
give it up. In short, there was a flagrant breach of the contract. In
refusing to apply to the general rule of equity which requires a
contract to be definite and certain in all of its terms, the corollary
9 204 S.W. 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
40236 S.W. 120 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) error ref.
41 184 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
429 Del. Ch. 74, 77 Atl. 80 (1910).
4Id. at 84.
4169 Cal. 663, 147 Pac. 561, 562 (1915).
"Ibid. See also Meyer v. Jenkins, 80 Ark. 209, 96 S.W. 991 (1906); Muller v.
Cooper, 165 Ga. 439, 141 S.E. 300 (1928); Caplan v. Buckner, 123 Md. 590, 91 Atl. 481
(1914); Inglis v. Fohey, 136 Wis. 28, 116 N.W. 857 (1908); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d j
7, at 276 (1958).
[Vol. 17
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
to that rule, viz., that expressions which at first appear incomplete
or uncertain are often readily made clear and plain by the aid of
(1) common usage, (2) reasonable implications of law and fact,
and (3) common sense, the court reached a conclusion which was
neither compelled nor justified by the facts.
William F. Russell
Federal Estate Tax-Deductions in Community Property
States-Funeral Expenses, Administration Expenses,
and Claims Against the State
Testator died domiciled in Texas owning community and separate
property. His will was probated in Texas and presented Widow with
an election.1 She could either: (1) not take under the will and retain
her vested one-half share of the community property or (2) take
under the will and effect Testator's disposition of her half share of
the community.' The will provided that if Widow elected to take
under the will, the executor was to pay out of Testator's half of
the community (a) "all and not merely one-half"3 of the funeral
expenses, (b) administration expenses, and (c) "all debts owing by
[Testator] whether community or separate."' There was also a
provision that if Widow elected not to take under the will, then
half of the funeral expenses, administration expenses, and debts
"shall be charged to the one-half share and portion of the com-
munity estate . . . vested in [Widow]."' Widow elected to take
under the will. The executor deducted all of the funeral expenses,
administration expenses,' and debts' to determine the taxable estate
in the federal estate tax return. The Commissioner determined a
deficiency by disallowing half of the deduction taken for commu-
' For an excellent discussion of the widow's election see Comment, The Widow's Elec-
tion-A Study in Three Parts, 15 Sw. L.J. 85 (1961).
2The wife is not put to an election unless the husband attempts to make a disposition
of his wife's property rights. See Comment, supra note 1, at 135.
'The quotation from the will appears in the district court's opinion. 189 F. Supp. 830,
832 (N.D. Tex. 1960).
4 Ibid.
'Id. at 833. Even without such a provision, if Widow had elected not to take under
the will, her half of the community property would have been so charged.
'The funeral expenses totaled $4,696.70. Brief for Taxpayer, p. 13.
'The total amount of administration expenses was $4,073.74.
'The debts, which were all community, totaled $32,367.74. Included in this amount
was $23,701.34 due for 1951 income taxes and interest thereon of $1,955.33. The govern-
ment did not distinguish between debts imposed by law and those founded on contract. The
court treated all debts as imposed by law.
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nity debts and by apportioning the administration expenses! The
executor paid the deficiency and sued for an alleged overpay-
ment. The district court sustained the disallowance." Held; reversed
(2-1) :" Debts imposed by law and funeral and administration ex-
penses are deductible in full when a testator's will provides for full
payment out of his estate. United States v. Stapf, 309 F.2d 592 (5th
Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 372 U. S. 928 (1963)." z
The federal estate tax"3 has had a continuous history since the
Revenue Act of 1916." Its constitutional validity has been upheld
because it is an indirect tax not requiring apportionment." The basic
structure of the tax has been unchanged since the first enactment
in 1916;" that is, gross estate" minus deductions and exemptions
determines the taxable estate" with the tax imposed on the transfer
of the taxable estate."'
The Stapf case involved section 812 of the 1939 Code, which
allows deductions from the gross estate of (1) funeral expenses,
(2) administration expenses, and (3) claims against the estate that
"are allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction . . . under which the
"The Commissioner determined that 65% of the administration expenses should be
allocated to and deducted from Testator's gross estate. The remaining 35% was allocated to
Widow's one-half of the community. The Commissioner allowed the deduction for the
full amount of the funeral expenses.
10189 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Tex. 1960).
"' Justice Brown joined in Justice Bell's majority opinion. Judge Wisdom filed a vigorous
dissent.
" The case was decided under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and before the Texas
Probate Code became effective on January 1, 1954. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 435. However,
apparently none of the changes in either the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 or in the
Texas Probate Code would alter the result.
The marital deduction, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812(e); Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §
2056, which was also involved, will not be discussed in this Note. The general topic to-
gether with a discussion of the district court's opinion, which was affirmed by the Fifth
Circuit, is discussed in Comment, supra note 1, at 138-41.
13Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 55 2001-56.
14 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §5 200-212, 39 Stat. 777.
"SNew York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921). See also Lowndes, Current
Constitutional Problems in Federal Taxation, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 469 (1951); Lowndes, The
Constitutionality of the Federal Estate Tax, 20 Va. L. Rev. 141 (1933).
" For a brief history of the government's early ventures into the field of death taxes
before the Revenue Act of 1916, see Lowndes & Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 7
(1956). An historical discussion since 1916 appears in 1 Mertens, Law of Federal Gift and
Estate Taxation §5 201-03 (1959).
a" Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 5 202, 39 Stat. 777. The current sections to determine
the value of the gross estate are § 2031-44, Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
18 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 203, 39 Stat. 778. The current sections allowing
exemptions and deductions to determine the value of the taxable estate are 55 2051-56,
Int. Rev. Code of 1954. Prior to the 1954 Code, the term "net estate" was used instead
of "taxable estate," without substantial difference in meaning.
'
9 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 201, 39 Stat. 777. The current corresponding section
is 5 2001, Int. Rev. Code of 1954. The most significant addition to the basic estate tax
structure was the allowance of credits for state death taxes. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch.
234, § 301, 43 $tat, 303. The credits are now allowed in 5§ 2011-15, Int. Rev. Code of
1954.
1963] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
estate is being administered.""0 The quoted phrase, which has been
in the estate tax provision since 1916,1 makes the deductibility of
a particular item depend upon state law. Texas law relevant to each
of the three deductible items should be considered separately as sug-
gested by Judge Wisdom in his dissent."2
I. TEXAS LAW IN ABSENCE OF WILL PROVISION
A. Funeral Expenses
The deduction for funeral expenses was not in issue in the Stapf
case' because the full amount was allowed upon the authority of
Blair v. Stewart, decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1931.2' However,
a careful reading of the cases cited in Stewart reveals that the Fifth
Circuit misconstrued Texas law."2 Clearly, in Texas funeral ex-
'0 Section 812 also provides "The deduction herein allowed in the case of claims against
the estate . . . shall, when founded upon a promise or agreement, be limited to the extent
that they are contracted bona fide for an adequate and full consideration." One contention
of the government was that there was no adequate and full consideration for more than
half of the community debts "for in the case of the community debts founded upon
agreements, one-half of the consideration is attributable to the wife, and the other one-half
to the husband." Brief for Government (appellee), p. 15-16. The court did not reach the
question of consideration because "the debts here were in the main for income taxes . . .
debts imposed by law. The contention of the government would be well taken if the debts
were founded on contract. . . . [H]owever . . . none are pointed out as arising under con-
tract." 309 F.2d at 596. The court thus limited its holding regarding the deductibility of
claims against the estate, which the testator assumes in his will, to claims imposed by law.
as Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 203, 39 Stat. 778.
2" Judge Wisdom criticized the majority for failing to differentiate between funeral ex-
penses, administration expenses, and debts because each "is a distinct category controlled by
its own rationale in determining whether it is chargeable to the decedent's estate or
to the community." 309 F.2d at 605.
23 309 F.2d at 594 n.3.
2449 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 658 (1931). The Fifth Circuit, in
Stewart, held that all funeral expenses are deductible from the decedent's half of the com-
munity property. This holding was partially based upon the court's finding that "[T]he
administrator of an estate has no authority to administer any estate except that of the
decedent and therefore cannot administer on the behalf of the community property that
belongs to the surviving spouse." 49 F.2d at 259. This finding is erroneous. See text ac-
companying note 28 infra. The Fifth Circuit, in Stewart, cited Gilroy v. Richards, 63 S.W.
664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) and Goldberg v. Zellner, 235 S.W. 870 (Tex. Comm. App.
1921), for holding that community and not separate property is primarily chargeable with
funeral expenses. However, the court admitted that it was not clear from the Gilroy
opinion whether the entire community or only the decedent's share was liable. But, according
to the court, any doubt was set to rest by Richardson v. McCloskey, 276 S.W. 680 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1925), "where it was held that funeral expenses were chargeable against 'the
estate.' The only estate there being administered was the interest of the decedent in com-
munity property. ... Therefore, according to the court, funeral expenses must be charge-
able to the decedent's one-half interest in the community property only. 49 F.2d at 259.
25 Richardson v. McCloskey, 276 S.W. 680 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925), upon which the
Stewart court relied so heavily, does not support its holding. In Richardson, both the
husband and wife were deceased, the wife survived by three years. The dispute was be-
tween legatees and devissees of both. One issue concerned whether the husband's tombstone
and curbing around his cemetery lot were funeral expenses. The lower court held the two
items were not funeral expenses and the wife had contracted to be individually liable for
their payment. The commission of appeals reversed, stating: "Indeed, the case of Goldberg v.
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penses of a deceased spouse are primarily chargeable to the entire
community estate and are payable prior to partition." Therefore,
for federal taxation of Texas estates only one-half of the funeral
expenses should be allowed as a deduction. Notwithstanding Texas
law, after the Stewart decision "it has been the uniform practice of
examining revenue agents in Texas to allow all of the decedent's
funeral expenses . . . as a deduction ... ""
B. Administration Expenses
Under Texas law, an executor or administrator may or may not
administer the entire community estate, depending upon a number
of factors." But, for purposes of the estate tax deduction, the cir-
cumstances under which the entire community estate or only a
portion thereof is administered are unimportant. What is important
is the liability for the administration expenses. In Texas, when the
entire community estate is administered, the entire community is
liable for administration expenses."9 Also, there is authority for ap-
portionment of the administration expenses between the deceased's
separate property and the community."0 The district court in the
principal case allowed a deduction from Testator's gross estate based
Zellner [supra note 24] . . . is itself authority for the holding that the community estate
is primarily liable for such expense in the absence of a contract to the contrary." 276 S.W.
at 684. A subsequent phrase, which was the one relied upon in the Stewart case, supra note
24, reads as follows: "[F]uneral expenses would include a tombstone . . . an expenditure
for such purpose should be allowed and charged against the estate." (Emphasis added.) 276
S.W. at 684. It is apparent from what the commission of appeals said earlier that it was
referring to the community estate as a whole when it said "the estate."
"Pickens v. Pickens, 125 Tex. 410, 83 S.W.2d 951 (1935); Goggans v. Simmons, 319
S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.; 18 Tex. Jur. 2d Decedents Estates §
256 (1960). In Norwood v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 145 S.W.2d 1100 (Tex. Civ. App.
1940), one court of civil appeals declared:
We think the authorities are also clear and to the effect that the item of
funeral expenses is a legitimate charge against said community estate and
deductible therefrom before partition. [The court then quoted extensively
from Richardson v. McCloskey, supra note 25]. Further, if there be any-
thing in the opinion in Blair v. Stewart, 5 Cir., 49 F.2d 257, implying a dif-
ferent application of the rules of law employed in the disposition of this
appeal, then we are of the opinion that that authority cannot be given any
effect here in view of the opinions of our Supreme Court above cited [re-
ferring to the Richardson and Goldberg cases, see notes 24, 25 supra] as well
as those of other appellate courts of this state. 145 S.W. at 1103.
"7 Childress, Community Property in the Administration of Estates in Texas, in Texas
Institutes: 2 Business and Family Planning 155, 178 (1957).
"'A discussion of the circumstances under which the entire community estate, or only
a portion thereof, could be administered is outside the scope of this Note. For the Texas
statutes concerning the administration of community estates, see Tex. Prob. Code Ann.
55 155-77 (1956).
"'Morris v. Halbert, 36 Tex. 19 (1872); Norwood v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 145
S.W.2d 1100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error ref.; 18 Tex. Jur. 2d Decedents Estates § 234
(1960).
Pg o&gans y. Simmons, 319 S,W,2d 442 (Tex, Civ App..MS) error ref. n.r.e.
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upon an allocation of the administration expenses."1 The Fifth Cir-
cuit allowed deduction of the full amount. However, no Texas case
has been found in which the cost of administration of the entire
community was charged only to the decedent's one-half share of the
community property in the absence of a will provision so directing.
When there is no such will provision and the wife dies first, the
courts have allowed the deduction of all administration expenses
upon the theory that only her one-half of the community is ad-
ministered."a But, when the husband dies first, without a will pro-
vision, the courts have allowed deduction of only one-half of the
administration expenses; the theory here is that the entire community
property is administered.'
Deductibility should not be based upon which spouse dies first.
As mentioned above, 4 various factors determine what part of the
community property is to be administered. To arrive at the amount
to be allowed as a deduction, the property actually administered
must be determined. Then the expenses can be apportioned between
the decedent's estate and the survivor's estate according to the time
and effort expended on each. Only the expenses incurred in admin-
istering the decedent's estate would be deductible."'
C. Claims Against The Estate
The Texas Probate Code provides that "community property,
except such as is exempt from forced sale, shall be charged with all
valid and enforceable debts existing at the time of dissolution of
marriage by death."'8 Thus, by statute the entire community prop-
erty is charged with community debts.' Although there is no men-
tion in the Texas Probate Code of personal liability of the husband
for community debts, without question during the lifetime of both
husband and wife, the husband is considered primarily liable for
community debts.'" However, "the community property of the
31 See note 9 supra.
"'Katherine Schuhmacher, 8 T.C. 453 (1947).
"Blackburn's Estate v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1950).
" See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
"SSee Jackson, Community Property and Federal Taxes, 12 Sw. L.J. 1, 37 (1958),
suggesting that such apportionment would be the better rule.
' Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 156 (1956). The statute in force prior to the effective date
of the Probate Code, January 1, 1956, had almost the same language. Former art. 3661,
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1925).
" There is substantial case law to the same effect. Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83
S.W.2d 620 (1935); Nesbitt v. First Nat'l Bank, 108 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937);
Cockrell v. Lovejoy, 44 S.W.2d 1040 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), aff'd, 63 S.W.2d 1009 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1933).
"SGrebe v. First State Bank, 136 Tex. 226, 150 S.W.2d 64 (1941); Leatherwood v.
Arnold, 66 Tex. 414, 1 S.W. 173 (1886).
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husband and wife shall be liable for their debts contracted during
marriage, except in such cases as are specially exempted by law.""a
The personal liability of the husband, therefore, comes into existence
only when there is a valid community debt, but insufficient com-
munity funds to satisfy it. In that event, the husband's separate
property can be reached." It is clear from the above discussion that
a husband in Texas is not personally liable for debts in the true sense
of the words. It is the community, under his control, which is
liable.41
5 9Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4620 (1960).0 In Clark v. First Nat'l Bank, 210 S.W. 677 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919), the court stated:
Under our law the community property is the primary fund for the pay-
ment of community debts, and we think that, where there exists sufficient
community property to pay the community debts, no resort can be had to
the separate property of the deceased spouse for the purpose of paying such
debts, though such property is, of course, liable if the community property
should prove to be insufficient. Id. at 679.
The Texas courts will probably continue to refer to the husband's liability for com-
munity debts as "personal." The expression should be understood to mean that although
the husband is liable for valid community debts, he may use community funds, of which
one-half belongs to the wife, to extinguish these debts. In other words, the husband is
entitled to pay the "personal" obligation with property belonging to one not considered per-
sonally liable. It would seem more accurate, therefore, to say that the community property
(under the management of the husband) is primarily liable for community debts, with the
husband secondarily liable. This proposition finds support in the cases in which the hus-
band pays a valid community debt out of his separate property and is allowed reimburse-
ment from the community for one-half of the amount of the debt. See Sargeant v.
Sargeant, 118 Tex. 343, 15 S.W.2d 589 (1929); Martin v. McAllister, 94 Tex. 567, 63
S.W. 624 (1901). The right of reimbursement is the same when the wife advances funds
to the community out of her separate funds. Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d
620 (1935).
" The court distinguished between debts imposed by law and debts founded on con-
tract. See note 20 supra. This distinction should not have been reached in the Stapf case.
The claim, whether it be imposed by law or founded on contract, must be a claim against
the estate. The Code itself so requires. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812. Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 2053. Texas law is clear that the wife's half of the community is charged with half
of the valid community debts regardless of the source of the debt. See notes 36, 37 supra
and accompanying text.
The distinction between debts imposed by law and those founded on contract first ap-
peared in 1932. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 805, 47 Stat. 280. Section 805 provided:
"The deduction herein allowed in the case of claims against the estate . . . shall, when
founded upon a promise or agreement, be limited to the extent that they were contracted
bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth." The
House Ways and Means Committee Report relating to section 805 stated:
The principal changes made are . . . (4) A clarifying provision limiting the
requirements of an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth
to liabilities founded on contract. The existing law might be open to a con-
struction under which no claim against the estate would be deductible unless
supported by an "adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth,"
but the real intent could hardly have been to deny the deduction of liabilities
imposed by law or arising out of torts, and the amendment whereby the
requirement of a consideration applies only where the liability is founded on
contract is designed to clear up any doubt which may be thought to exist.
H. R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1932).
The same language appeared in S. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1932).
The only distinction for estate tax purposes between a debt imposed by law and one
founded on contract is that the debt imposed by law, to be deductible, does not have to
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In cases without a will provision, only half of the debts have been
allowed as a deduction." This is unchanged by the Stapf case which
holds that when a husband who is personally liable for debts in-
cludes such a provision in his will, then the full amount of the com-
munity debts is deductible from his gross estate.
II. THE EFFECT OF A WILL PROVISION
The Stapf will provided for payment of all funeral expenses, ad-
ministration expenses, and debts out of Testator's half of the com-
munity. The court allowed the deduction for the full amount of:
(1) the funeral expenses based upon the authority of Blair v.
Stewart," (2) the administration expenses on the basis of the will
provision," and (3) the community debts on the basis of (a) the
husband's personal liability and (b) the will provision.' The basis
for (1) accepting the deduction for the full amount of the funeral
expenses is erroneous since Blair v. Stewart misconstrues Texas law."
Because the community, not the husband, is liable for community
debts, basis (3) (a) is incorrect.' Thus, if the deduction for the
full amount of community debts and administration expenses is to
be sustained, it must be based upon the will provision.
In discussing the effect of the will provision upon the deductibility
of administration expenses and debts, the court stated: "Texas law
makes it abundantly clear that decedent by the terms of his will
could so obligate his estate and his community property."4 How-
ever, the citations in support of this statement are will construction
cases in which the parties to the suits were devisees.4' The effect
of such provisions upon the rights of creditors to enforce claims
against the entire community property was not determined.
be supported by an adequate and full consideration. However, the debt imposed by law,
to be deductible, must meet the ever present first requirement that it be a claim against
the estate, for the simple reason that it is claims against the estate that are deductible. In
Texas the wife's half of the community debts is not a claim against her husband's estate
as contemplated by the federal estate tax.
"Lang's Estate v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1938).
" See text accompanying notes 23, 24 supra.
" 309 F.2d at 596.
4' Ibid.
" See notes 23-27 supra and accompanying text.
47 See notes 36-42 supra and accompanying text.
48 309 F.2d at 596.
49 See Mathews v. Jones, 245 S.W.2d 974 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Medlin v. Medlin,
203 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) error ref., cited by the court, 309 F.2d at 596.
The majority also relied upon Lang's Estate v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir.
1938), as authority which recognized, but did not apply "the principle that community
debts are deductible in their entirety from the community interest of the decedent in de-
termining estate tax liability where directed by the provisions of the will." (Emphasis
added.) 309 F.2d at 595. The majority quoted from Lang's Estate as follows:
On this issue we think the Board was correct in permitting a deduction of
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The present test of the deductibility of a claim against the estate
is whether under local law it is enforceable against decedent's estate.50
Unfortunately, such a test does not designate by whom the claim
must be enforceable. Clearly, however, the phrase "claims against
the estate" implies claims by creditors or parties similarly situated,
e.g., taxing authorities or judgment creditors, to whom the de-
ceased became personally obligated to pay during his lifetime. A
better test for deductibility of claims against the estate would be
one based upon the rights of creditors to enforce claims against the
decedent's estate or the entire community. A community creditor
is not bound by a will provision in the face of statutory law making
all community property liable for community debts, even though
devisees are bound."' Thus, a will provision should not affect the
deductibility of a claim against the estate."2 The assumption by the
testator of the community debts for which the entire community
is liable is nothing more than a legacy to the wife of an amount
equal to one-half of the community debts.
The assumption by the testator of all administration expenses is
likewise a legacy to the wife because her half of the community,
when administered, is charged with its administration expenses.
Further, it seems reasonable that only those administration expenses
only one-half of these communtiy obligations. Regardless of the incidents of
the husband's personal liability for community debts during his lifetime, Sec-
tion 1342, Remington's Revised Statutes, supra, as construed by the Supreme
Court of Washington, requires that community debts be satisfied pro rata
from that portion of the community property distributable to the wife and
that portion subject to the husband's testamentary disposition. It is only by
provision of a deceased husband's will that a community debt may be charged
solely against his share of the community. Redelsheimer v. Zepin, 105 Wash.
199, 202, 177 P. 736; In re Hart's Estate, 150 Wash. 482, 492, 273 P. 735.
309 F.2d at 595.
However, the cases cited by Lang's Estate also involve the construction of wills. For a
discussion of the rights of creditors, notwithstanding the will provision, see the discussion
of the Redelsheimer case, note 51 infra.
" Commissioner v. Kelly's Estate, 84 F.2d 958 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S.
603 (1936); Smyth v. Erickson, 221 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1955); Glascock v. Commissioner,
104 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1939).
" The State of Washington, a community property state, has a statute similar to Tex.
Prob. Code Ann. § 156 (1956), note 36 supra, charging the entire community property with
community debts. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 5 11.04.050 (1963). In a will construction case
the Supreme Court of Washington said:
It is no doubt true that the creditors of the estate may subject the whole
estate to the payment of their claims. If a testator should direct that the
debts should be paid from his part of the community estate, and such estate
was not sufficient to pay all the debts of the community, the creditors, under
the above statute might subject the whole estate to the payment of the debts.
. . . Redelsheimer v. Zepin, 105 Wash. 199, 177 Pac. 736 (1919).
52 When the testator's property is sufficient, the creditors will be paid according to the
testator's directions, but since this does not affect the rights of the creditor against the
entire community property, it should not affect the deductibility under federal estate
tax law.
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incurred in administering property included in the gross estate should
be allowed as a deduction. The wife's half of the community prop-
erty is not included in the deceased husband's gross estate for estate
tax purposes;s3 therefore, the cost of administering her one-half of
the community property should not be allowed as a deduction from
the husband's gross estate.
III. CONCLUSION
In Texas the widow's one-half of the community is liable for
one-half of the community debts; consequently, the assumption by
the testator of these debts is nothing more than a legacy to the
wife. As such it should not be deductible as a "claim against the
estate" for purposes of federal estate tax. The Supreme Court should
reverse the Fifth Circuit on this point and allow only one-half of
the community debts as a deduction. The Court should declare that
the deductibility of a claim against the estate is determined by the
rights of creditors or taxing authorities to enforce their claims against
the entire community property or only a portion thereof regardless
of will provisions to the contrary."
Because the funeral expenses deduction is not in issue, the Supreme
Court may not express a view. However, according to Texas law,
the Commissioner could rightfully allow only one-half of such
expense as a deduction.
The entire community and Testator's separate property were ad-
ministered in the Stapf case. Thus, the entire community is liable
for the cost of administering the community property. That portion
of the administration expenses actually expended in administering
Testator's separate property and his one-half of the community
property should be allowed as a deduction. The expenses in ad-
ministering Widow's one-half of the community property should
not be allowed."
Sam N. Vilches, Jr.
saint. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2033. A similar provision appeared in the 1939 Code. See
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811 (a). See also Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259
F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959); Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F.2d
486 (4th Cir. 1955). Even when the widow elects to take under the will, her one-half of
the community is not includable in the husband's gross estate. G.C.M. 7773, XI-2 Cum.
Bull. 426 (1930); Comment, supra note 1, at 135.
54 See notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text.
5 See notes 34, 35 supra and accompanying text.
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Labor Law - Jurisdiction - Pre-emption
In an original habeas corpus proceeding, Plaintiff, a union agent,
sought release from a contempt order. Intentionally ignoring the
trial court's temporary injunction order, Plaintiff had continued to
picket employer's refinery.' Plantiff contended that the injunction
was void, arguing that under sections 7' and 8' of the National Labor
Relations Act federal legislation had pre-empted the labor activity in-
volved, and, thus, state courts were without jurisdiction to enjoin the
picketing. The Texas Supreme Court ruled that the activity was not
arguably subject to sections 7 or 8, and upheld the trial court's juris-
diction.! On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated the
judgment in a per curiam opinion and held: Primary and exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether activity is either arguably pro-
tected or prohibited is vested in the NLRB, and state courts do not
have jurisdiction over cases involving such activity in the absence
of a NLRB ruling that such activity is neither protected nor pro-
hibited, or of a compelling precedent applied to essentially undisputed
facts. Ex parte George, 371 U.S. 72 (1962).
The doctrine of pre-emption, although not confined to the field
of labor law, is a creature of comparatively recent legislative policy
in the area of labor-management. By virtue of the interestate com-
'Plaintiff's union was also enjoined by the trial court; however, the union was not
found guilty of contempt.
aNational Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1958), as amended, Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) S 101,
61 Star. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958), provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158 (a) (3)
of this title.
'National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) 55 8(a), (b), 49 Star. 452 (1935),
29 U.S.C. S 158 (1958), as amended, 73 Stat. 525, 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158, (Supp.
II, 1959). Sections 8(a) and 8(b) define prohibited unfair labor practices by an employer
and by labor organizations or their agents respectively.
- Tex. _ 358 S.W.2d 590 (1962).
'Cases which have applied constitutional limitations to deny state court injunction
power over peaceful picketing are different from those cases which invoke the doctrine of
pre-emption. In Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the United States Supreme
Court held that the states cannot enjoin peaceful picketing because the latter is equated to
speech which cannot be abridged. U.S. Const. amend. I. The Thornhill type situation gen-
erally involved intrastate commerce; federal legislation was not applicable. See also
Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943); Bakery & Pastry Drivers Union v.
Wohl, 315 U.S. 704 (1942); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Carlson v. California,
310 U.S. 106 (1940). However, after these cases, the Court greatly restricted its original
concept of picketing as a constitutional right. See, e.g., Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S.
284 (1957); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage
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merce and the supremacy clauses' of the Constitution, Congress can
preclude state action in any matter involving interstate commerce.
The Court has construed the National Labor Relations Act,' as
amended by the Taft-Hartley'0 and Landrum-Griffin Acts," to mean
that Congress delegated primary and exclusive jurisdiction over cer-
tain areas of labor-management conduct to the National Labor Re-
lations Board." As a result, state court jurisdiction was "pre-empted"
in cases that involved activity either authorized by section 7 as
"arguably protected" substantive rights,"a or designated as "arguably
prohibited" labor practices by section 8."
Although not precisely defined and largely circumscribed, there
remained an area of permissive state power. Mass picketing, violence,
activity which threatened public peace and welfare, or conduct
inimical to a substantial local policy has been recognized as labor
activity not pre-empted by the act and thus subject to state juris-
diction through its police power."
Initially, the "pre-emption" doctrine applied to "substantive
rights" which were "protected" by section 7 and to unfair labor
practices which were "prohibited" by section 8. The earliest cases
concerned a conflict between state law and federal policy as em-
bodied in the act.' No distinction was made between legislative and
& Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Milk Wagon Drivers of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941). Furthermore, contemporaneous with this limitation of the
Thornhill principle, the Court, nevertheless, began to restrict state action by utilization of
the pre-emption doctrine. The expansive concept of interstate commerce as evidenced by
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), is the basis for, and has given
impetus to, the latter doctrine. See generally Jeffers, The Labor Injunction in Texas Courts
Today, 36 Texas L. Rev. 938 (1958).
6 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
'U.S. Const. art. VI.
8"If the Congressional enactment occupies the field, its control by the Supremacy
Clause supersedes or, in the current phrase, pre-empts state power." UAW v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 271 (1951).
0National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. 55
151-68 (1958).
"0 Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
55 141-97 (1958).
" Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act), 73 Stat.
525 (1959), 29 U.S.C. S5 153-87 (Supp. III, 1962).
' See, e.g., Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740
(1942).
a See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340
U.S. 383 (1951); UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538
(1945).
14 See, e.g., Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 338 U.S.
953 (1950).
"'Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949); Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
"s See Amalgamated Ass'n of Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340
U.S. 383 (1951); UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); Plankinton Packing Co. v.
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judicial pre-emption; if the activity was "protected" or "prohibited,"
state courts had no jurisdiction. 7
In 1953, the Court significantly extended the pre-emption doctrine
in Garner v. Teamsters," when it held that a Pennsylvania court did
not have jurisdiction to enjoin picketing even though it violated state
law and was not expressly prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act."
Reasoning that picketing, which was not expressly "prohibited" by
the act, may have been impliedly "protected," the Court concluded
that the picketing was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Board." Four years earlier in UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Bd.," the Court was unwilling to imply that the specific con-
duct was "protected" and thus pre-empted because Congress did
not expressly delegate to the Board the power to permit or forbid
the specific conduct involved." The basic proposition advanced by
the Garner decision was that the Board, not the courts, was to decide
whether an activity was "protected" or "prohibited."" The sweep of
this rule flows from the following language of Mr. Justice Jackson:
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be en-
forced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties.
It went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules
to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed particular
procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and de-
cision, including judicial relief pending a final administrative order....
A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 338 U.S. 953 (1950); La Crosse Tel. Corp. v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 18 (1949); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New
York Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
But cf., Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S.
301 (1949); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
" See cases cited in note 16 supra.
's346 U.S. 485 (1953).
1' The Court stated:
The detailed prescription of a procedure for restraint of specified types of
picketing would seem to imply that other picketing is to be free of other
methods and sources of restraint. For the policy of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act is not to condemn all picketing but only that ascertained by its
prescribed processes to fall within its prohibitions. Otherwise, it is implicit
in the Act that the public interest is served by freedom of labor to use the
weapon of picketing. For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat
designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if
the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods which the
federal Act prohibits. Id. at 499-500. (Emphasis added.)
20Id. at 501.
"1336 U.S. 245 (1949).
2The activity consisted of frequent intermittent work stoppages by the union em-
ployees. "Congress made no express delegation of power to the Board to permit or forbid
this particular union conduct, from which an exclusion of state power could be implied."
Id. at 253. The Court held that this type of activity was either governable by the states or
entirely ungoverned.
"3 Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485, 489 (1953).
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apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different
rules of substantive law.24
Subsequent to Garner, in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon,25 the Court expanded pre-emption into areas in which
substantive conduct-either "protected" or "prohibited"-was argu-
ably at issue. Speaking for the majority in Garmon, Justice Frank-
furter said:
At times it has not been clear whether the particular activity regulated
by the States was governed by § 7 or § 8 or was, perhaps, outside both
these sections. But courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate such
issues. It is essential to the administration of the Act that these determi-
nations be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations
Board. What is outside the scope of this Court's authority cannot re-
main within a state's power and state jurisdiction too must yield to
the exclusive primary competence of the Board. . . .When an activity
is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the states as well as the
Federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with
national policy is to be averted."0 (Emphasis added.)
From Garmon, the permissible area of state power was restricted to
explicit determinations by the NLRB that the activity was neither
"protected" nor "prohibited," and to cases of "compelling prec-
edent applied to essentially undisputed facts." '27 Moreover, refusal
of the NLRB to assert jurisdiction does not grant power to state
courts to act.2' Garmon made "pre-empted jurisdiction" a corollary
to "arguably protected" substantive rights and "arguably prohibited"
unfair labor practices. Although "arguably protected" and "arguably
prohibited" were admitted to be nebulous limitations upon the
doctrine, 29 mere assertion of pre-emption does not deprive state courts
of jurisdiction." "Arguably protected" and "arguably prohibited"
have been defined as "susceptible of reasonable argument."" Garmon
re-affirmed the jurisdiction of state courts over conduct "not argu-
14id. at 490.
25 359 U.S. 236 (1959). This case is commonly referred to as the second Garmon
decision. (Hereinafter referred to as Garmon.)
1 Id. at 244-45.
27 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959).
21Id. at 245-46. See also Goss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
" Id. at 237-44. In Machinists Ass'n v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), Justice
Frankfurter indicated the uncertainty of the limitations by stating that "the statutory
implications concerning what has been taken from the States and what has been left to them
are of a Delphic nature, to be translated into concreteness by the process of litigating
elucidation." Id. at 619.
so Retail Clerks Union v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 222, 339 P.2d 839 (1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 864 (1959).
" Grunwald-Marx, Inc. v. Los Angeles Joint Bd. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 52 Cal.
2d 568, 343 P.2d 23 (1959).
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ably protected" or "not arguably prohibited" and designated this
type of activity as one of a "peripheral concern" to national policy."
However, peripheral concern was expressly used in the Garmon
case"3 in reference to cases in which the state jurisdiction was based
upon a compelling state interest in preserving domestic tranquility"4
and in instances in which the state remedy had no federal counter-
part. Furthermore, state courts have no jurisdiction to determine
if "protected" or "prohibited" conduct is arguably at issue."
Despite the far-reaching pronouncements in Garner and Garmon,
state courts can exercise jurisdiction through their police powers over
"arguably protected" or "arguably prohibited" conduct when vio-
lence, mass picketing, and threats to public peace are present."7 Also,
state courts have been permitted to assume jurisdiction in order to
provide a remedy not otherwise available under the act. Thus, state
court jurisdiction was upheld to grant damages in a common law
tort action,38 compensatory and punitive damages to an employee
who was prevented from working because of picketing activity,"9
and damages to an union employee for wrongful expulsion from a
union. The Taft-Hartley Act provided another exception to total
pre-emption by granting federal district courts, or any other court
having jurisdiction over the parties, jurisdiction over various types
of union activity including hot-cargo agreements, secondary boy-
cotts, and work assignment disputes.41 The Landrum-Griffin Act
added a fourth exception to the pre-emption doctrine by granting
state courts power to act if the NLRB has refused jurisdiction over
disputes because the effect upon interstate commerce is not con-
sidered substantial. 2
In the George case, the Texas Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction
"2See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959).
"Id. at 243-44, 247-48.
84See UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S.
131 (1957); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
a" United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
"8In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959), the Court
stated: "Nor has it mattered whether the States have acted through laws of broad general
application rather than laws specifically directed towards the governance of industrial
relations." See Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
348 U.S. 468 (1955), for cases in which state courts relied on general restraint of trade
statutes to support jurisdiction.
a Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Re-
lations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956); Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
" United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
38 UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
"0Machinists Ass'n v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
'61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1958), as amended, 73 Stat. 545 (1959), 29
U.S.C. § 187 (Supp. III, 1962).
473 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (Supp. III, 1962).
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on the ground that Plaintiff's conduct was neither "arguably pro-
tected" nor "arguably prohibited" and, therefore, not pre-empted."
The Texas court denied the writ of habeas corpus because the pri-
mary purpose of Plaintiff's conduct, as found by the trial court,
was to secure the breach of a valid and subsisting labor contract be-
tween employer and another union," activity contrary to the public
policy of the state as expressed in its statutes." The picketing activity
was ruled to be one of peripheral concern to national policy.
Previous interpretations of the pre-emption doctrine as expressed
in Garner and Garmon indicated that the courts are not primary
tribunals to determine whether the activity in question is one of
peripheral concern to national policy, unless the conduct comes
within an exception to the pre-emption doctrine. Although Justice
Frankfurter envisioned situations in which it would be difficult to
determine whether activity was governed by the act, he concluded
that the "courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues.""
In these instances, state jurisdiction "must yield to the exclusive and
primary competence of the Board."47 Ruling that the plaintiff's ac-
tivity in the instant case "was conduct at least arguably protected by
section 7 of the act,"" the United States Supreme Court followed
the Garmon decision in vacating the judgment of the state court.
On remand, the plaintiff was purged of contempt." Subsequent to
the George decision, in Local 438 Const. & Gen. Laborers Union v.
Curry," the Court again reversed a state court injunction against
picketing, the alleged purpose of which was violative of a state right-
to-work law."2 The court ruled that the conduct was at least "argu-
ably prohibited," and thus pre-empted and reserved for exclusive
and primary jurisdiction of the NLRB.
The instant case is significant not only as an illustration of the
application of a reasonable policy embodied in the pre-emption doc-
43 Tex. -, 358 S.W.2d 590, 600 (1962).
44 Id. at 597.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5154d(4) (1962), provides, in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, singly or in concert with others, to
engage in picketing, the purpose of which, directly or indirectly, is to secure
the disregard, breach or violation of a valid subsisting labor agreement arrived
at between an employer and the representatives designated . . . by the em-
ployees.
4San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959); Garner v.
Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
" San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, supra note 46, at 245.
4s371 U.S. at 73 (1962).
49 Ibid.
"°Ex parte George, - Tex. .--, 364 S.W.2d 189 (1963).
51371 U.S. 542 (1963).
"Ga. Code Ann. § 54-804 (1961).
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trine," but also because it reflects an apparent reluctance by Texas
courts to understand or apply the sweeping effect of the Garmon
decision. "A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures
are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications
as are different rules of substantive law.""4 Conduct "arguably pro-
tected" or "arguably prohibited" offers a vague limitation on the
pre-emption doctrine. However, as Chief Justice Calvert in his dis-
sent on the motion for rehearing in the George case' points out,
matters of peripheral concern are left to the states, but peripheral
concern "was not intended as an escape phrase for ceding to state
courts jurisdiction to control peaceful picketing."" To the con-
trary, the regulation of strikes and picketing is an area of conduct
with which national policy is primarily concerned. The purpose
of plaintiff's picketing, although the basis of the Texas court's de-
cision, is immaterial in cases in which pre-emption applies." The
conduct-not the purpose-determines whether state courts may
assume jurisdiction under an exception to the general rule. More-
over, the employer was not without a remedy." As the George case
re-affirms, state courts should exercise restraint in asserting jurisdic-
tion in the absence of a compelling precedent based upon similar
facts or upon a NLRB ruling that the section 7 or section 8 conduct
is "not protected" or "not prohibited."
Donald J. Lucas
""The governing consideration is that to allow the States to control activities that are
potentially subject to federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict with
national labor policy." San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246
(1959).
'Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
5 Tex. -, 358 S.W.2d 590, 600 (1962).
'Id. at 601.
5 in the instant case, the Texas Supreme Court relied heavily upon the case of
Grunwald-Marx, Inc. v. Los Angeles Joint Bd. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 52 Cal.
2d 568, 343 P.2d 23 (1959). However, the question in that case involved jurisdiction
over the parties to a valid collective bargaining agreement which required arbitration in
case of disagreement. The union failed to arbitrate in breach of their agreement. In the
George case, Plaintiff had breached no agreement with the employer.
"s If the union employees had breached their no-strike agreement with the employer, the
state court had concurrent jurisdiction with federal district courts to grant damages for
business losses caused by the strike. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61
Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958). Teamster Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S.




Torts - Contractor's Liability for Injuries to Third
Parties - Effect of Acceptance of Work
Defendant contracted with the county to move a fence line to
clear the right of way for highway construction. After completion
of the project, the county accepted Defendant's work and turned
the right of way over to the State, whose own contractor and sub-
contractor began paving operations. Subsequently, Plaintiff was in-
jured when he stepped into a hole left unmarked and unfilled after
Defendant removed the fence. The jury found Defendant and
the State's subcontractor negligent and rendered judgment for Plain-
tiff. Defendant appealed on the ground that, except for inherently
dangerous structures and hidden defects, his liability to third parties
terminated upon "acceptance" of his work. Held: An independent
contractor's liability to third parties is based upon negligence and
does not terminate as a matter of law with "acceptance" of the com-
pleted work by the employer. Strakos v. Gehring,-Tex.-, 360
S.W.2d 787 (1962).
The rule in Texas1 has been, with certain exceptions, that an inde-
pendent contractor is not liable for injuries caused to third persons
after his work has been accepted by his contractee.' This rule is still
followed in many jurisdictions' for a variety of reasons. One is that
"acceptance" comes only after an inspection which would detect all
but hidden defects. The failure of the contractee to detect obvious
defects is considered intervening negligence which, as a matter of
law, breaks the chain of causation between the contractor's negli-
gence and the injury to the third party.! Another reason is that
the contractor no longer has the right, duty, or ability to control
the work.' In addition, there is language in some cases that adoption
of a contrary rule would so burden a contractor with potential li-
ability that prudent men would be discouraged from engaging in
1See Hartford v. Coolidge-Locker Co., 314 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); James
v. Beck, 109 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error ref.; Mansfield Constr. Co. v.
Gorsline, 292 S.W. 187, overruling motion for rehearing, 288 S.W. 1067 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1927). See also 37 Texas L. Rev. 354 (1959).
aThe term "contractee," sometimes referred to as the employer, is used to designate the
landowner or other party for whom the contractor does the work.
'Reynolds v. Manley, 223 Ark. 314, 265 S.W.2d 714 (1954); Del Gaudio v. Ingerson,
142 Conn. 564, 115 A.2d 665 (1955); Russell v. Arthur Whitcomb, Inc., 100 N.H. 171,
121 A.2d 781 (1956). See Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 865, 873 (1958); Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d
191, 201 (1950), for a complete list of jurisdictions.
4 See Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co.,
188 Ind. 79, 122 N.E. 1 (1919); First Presbyterian Congregation v. Smith, 163 Pa. 561,
30 Atl. 279 (1894); Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70, 21 Ati. 244 (1891).
5 See Reynolds v. Manley, 223 Ark. 314, 265 S.W.2d 714 (1954); Cunningham v. T. A.
Gillespie Co., 241 Mass. 280, 135 N.E. 105 (1922); Russell v. Arthur Whitcomb, Inc., 100
N.H. 171, 121 A.2d 781 (1956); First Presbyterian Congregation v. Smith, supra note 4.
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such occupations! Further, since most contractor-liability cases in-
volve realty or the structures thereon, many courts have stressed
the importance of possession and control. Analogizing the situation
to the landlord-tenant cases, some courts have refused to impose
liability upon the contractor after he has surrendered possession and
control upon which liability is based."
The origin of the rule of non-liability to third parties for negli-
gence after acceptance of the work can be traced back to dictum in
the early case of Winterbottom v. Wright.' Although decided cor-
rectly on its pleadings,' certain statements by the court were sub-
sequently construed to support the rule that without privity of
contract there can be no recovery in tort." Though subsequent de-
cisions engrafted certain exceptions on the rule,- until the decision
in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,1" manufacturers and contractors
were liable for negligence only to those in privity of contract. The
MacPherson case did away with the requirement of privity and im-
posed liability upon the manufacturer for negligence based upon the
forseeability of the injury. 3 Although the rationale of MacPherson
was broad enough to eliminate the privity requirement for con-
tractors as well as manufacturers, Texas was one of the jurisdictions
which adopted its rule as to manufacturers while refusing to apply
it to contractors." It is often stated that the two situations are dis-
tinguishable." Arguably, it is easier to detect defects in the manu-
a See Reynolds v. Manley, supra note 5; Schott v. Ingargolia, 180 So. 462 (La. App.
1938); Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70, 21 At. 244 (1891).7 See Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926) overruled on this point by Hannah
v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956); Williams
v. Edward Gillen Dock, Dredge & Constr. Co., 258 Fed. 591 (6th Cir. 1919); Travis
v. Rochester Bridge Co., 188 Ind. 79, 122 N.E. 1 (1919); Daugherty v. Herzog, 145 Ind.
255, 44 N.E. 457 (1896); First Presbyterian Congregation v. Smith, 163 Pa. 561, 30 Atl.
279 (1894).
010 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). The Winterbottom case is dis-
cussed in Tucker & Kuhn, The Decline of the Privity Rule in Tort Liability, 11 Pitt. L.
Rev. 236, 240 (1950). See also Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers and Vendors, 10
Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1925).
'Plaintiff sought to recover for injuries claiming reliance upon a contract to which he
was not a party.
"°See Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879); Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903); Tucker & Kuhn, op. cit. supra note 8, at 236.
" See Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., supra note 10 (imminently dangerous
articles); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852) (mislabeled drugs); Heaven v. Pender,
11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883) (implied invitation); Tucker & Kuhn, op. cit. supra note 8, at
240-42.
'" 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). The MacPherson case is discussed in 13 Texas
L. Rev. 514 (1935).
aSee Prosser, Torts 9 84 (2d ed. 1955).
14 See Jones v. Beck, 109 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error ref. (holding con-
tractor not liable); Johnson v. Murray Co., 90 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) error
dism. (holding manufacturer liable). See also 37 Texas L. Rev. 354, 355 (1959).
"5 See 62 Harv, L. Rkv, 145 (1948). As stated by the court in the principal case, "few
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facture of standardized goods than in the construction or design of
buildings or construction projects. In addition, structures created by
contractors generally outlive chattels which are manufactured. Final-
ly, the contractor usually follows specifications set by the party
letting the contract, and the latter normally inspects before accepting.
The manufacturer, on the other hand, follows his own specifications
and does his own inspecting."
Even those jurisdictions that have a rule of non-liability for
contractors have modified it by exceptions. The most notable applies
to contractors of structures deemed imminently or inherently
dangerous." The inherently dangerous quality of the structure may
arise from its very nature,"8 or from negligent construction of what
would ordinarily be a safe structure."9 For the exception to apply
in the latter type situation, the defect must be hidden, i.e., such that
a reasonable inspection on the part of the landowner or employer
would not discover it. If it could have been discovered by such in-
spection, the courts are likely to apply the general rule on the theory
that the intervening negligence on the part of the employer breaks
the chain of causation." In fact, the injured third party often has
the burden to show absence of knowledge of such defect on the part
of the landowner or employer as an element in his suit against the
contractor." Liability of the contractor under this exception pre-
supposes either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous
condition of the structure and the ability to foresee the danger to
those coming into contact with it."
Another exception to the general rule of non-liability is in cases
in which the contractor's act implies an invitation to third persons
to come into contact with the structure. Also, if the contractor's
courts have squarely considered what distinctions, if any, prevent the MacPherson rule . ..
from applying to contractors." 360 S.W.2d at 792. Most of the distinctions have been
made by the legal analysts, not the courts.
"6 See Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co., 188 Ind. 79, 122 N.E. 1 (1919). But see Foley
v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949) (stating that there is
no logical distinction between chattels and structures).
17See Kuhr Bros., Inc. v. Spahos, 89 Ga. App. 885, 81 S.E.2d 491 (1954); Berg v. Otis
Elevator Co., 64 Utah 518, 231 Pac. 832 (1924); Rousch v. Johnson, 139 W. Va. 607, 80
S.E.2d 857 (1954). See also cases collected in Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 865, 882 (1958); Annot.,
13 A.L.R.2d 191, 234 (1950).
is See Berg v. Otis Elevator Co., supra note 17.
19 See Freeman v. Mazzera, 150 Cal. App. 2d 61, 309 P.2d 510 (1957).
"°See Del Gaudio v. Ingerson, 142 Conn. 564, 115 A.2d 665 (1955); Sutton v. Otis
Elevator Co., 68 Utah 85, 249 Pac. 437 (1926).
21See Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co., supra note 20.
"See Galbraith v. Illinois Steel Co., 133 Fed. 485 (7th Cir. 1904); Del Gaudio v.
Ingerson, 142 Conn. 564, 115 A.2d 665 (1955); Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co., 68 Utah 85,
249 Pac. 437 (1926); Berg v. Otis Elevator Co., 64 Utah 518, 231 Pac. 832 (1924).
23See Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co., 333 Ill. 78, 164 N.E. 162 (1928); Wood v.
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act is found to have created a nuisance per se, liability may extend
to third parties after acceptance of the work." Of course, if a defect
is deliberately concealed by the contractor or if fraud is present,
the general rule is said not to be applicable.25
The exceptions, particularly the "inherently dangerous" type, are
liberally applied. As a result, even courts which pay lip service to
the general rule of non-liability decide most cases under one of the
exceptions."
Even though the harshness of the general rule has been consider-
ably modified by the recognized exceptions, objections still exist to
the necessity of its application. The court in the instant case recog-
nized that justice could be achieved under the rule of non-liability
by applying one of the recognized exceptions. 7 Nevertheless, the
court thought that such a holding would be unnecessarily artificial
and complicated. The majority states, "[A]fter having first decided
that there was an acceptance of the work, we would then have to
decide issues involving all the various exceptions to the rule and in
case any exception was found applicable, the basic issues of negligence
and proximate cause would still remain for consideration."2 There-
fore, the doctrine of non-liability after acceptance was rejected in
order to restore both logic and simplicity to the law. 9 The holding
is more logical because the purported distinctions"0 between the manu-
facturers and contractors situations are not persuasive; simplicity is
restored to the law by bringing the contractor's liability after accept-
ance within the general tort rules.
The court's rejection of the non-liability rule means that accept-
ance of the work by the contractee no longer establishes the absence
of proximate cause of the injury as a matter of law. Under the new
rule, acceptance of the work is merely one of the factors for jury
consideration in determining whether the chain of causation between
defendant's negligence and plaintiff's injury has in fact been broken.
Another factor the jury will consider in determining proximate cause
under the new rule is the foreseeability of injury resulting from the
Sloan, 20 N.M. 127, 148 Pac. 507 (1915); Sealise v. F. M. Vanzie & Co., 301 Pa. 315,
152 Atl. 90 (1930).
24See Queen v. Craven, 95 Ga. App. 178, 97 S.E.2d 523 (1957); Brown v. Welsbach
Corp., 301 N.Y. 212, 93 N.E.2d 640 (1950); Schumacher v. Carl G. Neumann Dredging
& Improvement Co., 206 Wis. 220, 239 N.W. 459 (1931).
2"See Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. Elmore & Hamilton Contracting Co., 175 Fed. 176
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1909); Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, 10 Ill. 2d 28, 139 N.E.2d 275
(1956); Holland Furnace Co. v. Nauracaj, 105 Ind. App. 574, 14 N.E.2d 339 (1938).
26 See Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 865, 870-71 (1958).
27 360 S.W.2d at 791 n.4.
2' 360 S.W.2d at 791.
29 Ibid.
30 See note 15 supra.
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unsafe condition of the land or structure. The length of time between
construction and injury will have a definite bearing upon foresee-
ability,"1 just as will the location of the land or structure. Under the
new rule, the fact that the employer or contractee discovers the
dangerous condition is also material to the question of proximate
cause. Although a majority of the jurisdictions still follow the old
rule of non-liability after acceptance,33 the rule adopted by the
court in the instant case is supported by most of the modern writers"
and cases."
According to the dissent, the defendant complied with everything
the contract with the county required him to do;3" negligence was
found in leaving the holes unfilled. Since filling was not required by
the contract, the dissenting justices feel that the majority is depart-
ing from well settled Texas law in imposing liability upon the con-
tractor for the result of a contract rather than negligence in the
performance thereof.37 Upon motion for rehearing, the majority
somewhat clarifies this point. It indicates that a contrary result might
have been reached if the defendant had merely followed directory
contractual provisions calling for leaving the holes unfilled. Under
such facts, the leaving of the holes unfilled would have been con-
sidered the act of the county and not that of the defendant-con-
tractor. In the instant case, however, the agreement was silent as to
the filling of the holes, and defendant's liability is based not upon
contract, but upon breach of duty owed by anyone working on a
31 360 S.W.2d at 791. See also Howard v. Redden, 93 Conn. 604, 107 Atl. 509 (1919).
But lapse of time should not, as a matter of law, affect causation where it is shown that
the defect was a substantial cause: Hale v. De Paoli, 32 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948)
(lapse of 18 years); Foley v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949)
(lapse of 13 months).
32 360 S.W.2d at 793. The court, however, indicates it will not follow Russell v. Whit-
comb, Inc., 100 N.H. 171, 121 A.2d 781 (1956), as to the "qualification" of the modern
rule that if the employer discovers the danger, his responsibility "supersedes" that of the con-
tractor. In accord with Russell v. Whitcomb, supra, are Miner v. McNamara, 81 Conn.
690, 72 Atl. 138 (1909); Price v. Johnston Cotton Co. of Wendel, 226 N.C. 758, 40
S.E.2d 344 (1946); Howard v. Reinhart & Donovan Co., 196 Okla. 506, 166 P.2d 10
(1946). The so called "qualification" is not applied if the contractor himself knows of
the danger. See Murphy v. Barlow Realty Co., 206 Minn. 527, 289 N.W. 563 (1939).
33 360 S.W.2d at 800. See note 3 supra.
' See 2 Harper & James, Torts § 18.5 (1956); Prosser, op. cit. supra note 13, § 85;
Tucker & Kuhn, op. cit. supra note 8, at 249; 10 Ark. L. Rev. 152 (1955); 37 Texas L.
Rev. 354, 357 (1959); Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 891 (1958).
3 See Hannah v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Cosgriff Neon Co. v.
Matthews, Nev. -, 371 P.2d 819 (1962); Russell v. Arthur Whitcomb, Inc., 100
N.H. 171, 121 A.2d 781 (1956); Foley v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 363 Pa. 1,
68 A.2d 517 (1949); Grodstein v. McGivern, 303 Pa. 555, 154 Atl. 794 (1931); Krisovich
v. John Booth, Inc., 181 Pa. Super. 5, 121 A.2d 890 (1956). But see Reynolds v. Manley,
223 Ark. 314, 265 S.W.2d 714 (1954).
3' 360 S.W.2d at 802.37 1d. at 799, citing Glade v. Dietert, 156 Tex. 382, 295 S.W.2d 642 (1956).
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highway "to refrain from creating conditions which are dangerous
to other persons using the same, or to warn of dangerous conditions
should the same be created. ' 'a"
Regardless of the validity of the dissent's criticism regarding the
imposition of liability for the result of a contract (rather than
negligence), it at least focuses upon a caveat for future consideration
by contractors. Other far-reaching effects of the new rule on con-
tractor's liability in Texas are yet to be seen. One, however, will
probably be that premiums for liability insurance of contractors will
be increased. This increase in cost will be passed on by higher con-
struction prices. Also, as a result of the decision, contractors will
have to be more cautious in undertaking jobs whose plans and
specifications call for foreseeably dangerous structures.
The holding of the instant case is to contractors in Texas what
MacPherson is to manufacturers generally. It removes the last vestige
of an unsupportable legal shield having its origin in misinterpreta-
tion of dictum" and carried over by artificial distinctions."0 The
modern rule of contractor liability for negligence based upon causa-
tion in fact plus foreseeability of injury where third parties are con-
cerned has much more justification in logic and in fairness than does
the arbitrary proposition that the chain of causation ends as a matter
of law with acceptance of the work. Public policy dictates, as the
Texas Supreme Court accurately stated, that the "acceptance of
defective work should not be a legal excuse for the negligent per-
formance of that work, nor for the leaving of premises in a dangerous
condition." ''.
Robert W. Minshew
3' 360 S.W.2d at 803-4.
09See Tucker & Kuhn, op. cit. supra note 8, at 246; 37 Texas L. Rev. 354 (1959).
40 See notes 15, 16 supra.
. 360 S.W.2d at 792.
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